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INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND INVESTMENT IN CHINA,
IT IS WRONG TO READ THE FACE OF THE CHINESE-FOREIGN JOINT
VENTURE LAW THAT THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS IS THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY
FengpingGao*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2017 China's inbound Foreign Direct Investment records hit an all-time at 135
billion U.S. dollars.' Meanwhile, a large number of international businesses, including U.S.
companies, pulled out from China and transferred their business to South Asian countries and
United States for a variety of considerations, including but not limited to the cheaper labor,
lax environmental regulations, and corporate tax cut and other policy objectives initiated
under the Trump Administration. The departure of foreign investors could trigger the
controversy among the original parties to the Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures ("FJV").
In a recent international business case, the original board chairperson disagreed with
the resolution reached by the shareholders to dismiss him, alleging that he was conferred with
the highest authority of the law to represent the company. Without the cooperation of the
incumbent board of directors, the successor of the chairperson failed to register with the
authorities in compliance with the law. The failure of registration was invoked as another
justification under the procedural law for the original chairperson to entrench his board
position. Consequently, since new directors were not installed, the FJV was not able to make
institutional decisions for the board of directors. The controversy remained detrimental to
the venture for five years.
The extensive litigation is not an isolated dispute with respect to the internal
struggle of the FJV. The relevant issues in another case, Sino-environment Technology,2 were
also brought before the Supreme People's Court of China. The highest court published its

Fengping Gao, M.A., D. Jur., and LLM. Fengping is a Professor of Law at the Inner Mongolia University of
Chinese & Technology (China). Courses taught include China Company Law, China Foreign Investment Law,
and International Business Transactions and Trade. Currently, Fengping is a fellow at Peking University
School of Law after he returned from Denver University's Strum College of Law. He also serves as
international consultant in Beijing and Denver. Fengping is grateful to Susan Lloyd at Denver University's
Strum College of Law for proofreading assistance and to Professor Peizhong Gan at Peking University School
of Law for discussions on the issues.
1 China Focus: China 2017 FDI Rises to Record High, ODI Falls, XINHUA (Jan. 16, 2018),
www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/16/c_1 36900334.htm.
2 See Sino-environment Technology Group (Fujian) Limited v. Sino-environment Technology Group Limited
(SUP. PEOPLE'S CT. 2014), http://lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?libcase&id=1503&EncodingName=gb2312
(addressing disputes of shareholders capital contribution) (China) [hereinafter Sino-environment Technology].
See also Sean Webb et. al., China Guiding Cases Project: Sino-Environment Technology Group Limited
Singapore v. Thumb Env-Tech Group (Fujian) Co., Ltd, STANDFORD LAW SCHOOL (Nov. 16, 2016),
https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/11I/B-and-R-TCl-English.pdf
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decision on the official gazette as a "typical case," which means the contested legal issues are
3
likely to be brought before the courts again and have a significant social impact on China.
the
under
The FJV's are specifically covered by poorly drafted laws and regulations
4
These
Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures.
regulations provide the highest authority for the board of directors. Such a provision
contradicts the fundamental principle of company law prescribing the board of the
shareholders to be the organ of authority at the company.' Additionally, registration with
authorities could easily be employed as the internal block to defeat the intent of the
shareholders; thus, leading the internal struggle into an impasse if such a procedural
undertaking is regarded as the condition to effectuate the replacement of the board directors.
FJV laws and regulations should be read side-by-side in order to solve controversy and
6
untangle the ambiguity of legislation. Regarding the issue of non-cooperation of a board of
directors, the legal principle should be applicable in cases of board dismissal where "one
7
cannot benefit from one's own wrongdoing or misconduct."
The purpose of this paper is to provide both an academic analysis on the issues for
international legal professionals, as well as practical advice to the house counsels of the FJV.
Part I provides background information with respect to the establishment of the FJVs and the
unique formation of its board of directors. Part II separately discusses the two issues often
raised by the original dismissed board of directors as defenses, namely, whether the board of
directors is the highest authority of the venture, and whether the successor registration must
be performed in order to effectuate the replacement. Part III evaluates the first claim with the
agency theory, the basis of the separation of ownership and management, and the method by
reading the text in conjunction with the context of the law. As to the procedural registration
issue, the paper resorts to the authority of the highest court case which directly deals with the
problem. The paper concludes the alleged defenses are void. Finally, Part IV appends the
legal advice in this regard.
II.

THE FJV AND ITS BOARD IN CHINA

With respect to the FJV in China, the specific governing laws and regulations
include the Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures
8
(2001) ("FJV LAW") and the Regulations for the Implementation of the Law on SinoForeign Equity Joint Ventures (2001)9 ("FJV Regulations"). China Company Law serves as
See Zhang Hangtao, The CriminalCase of Zhemba Court was Appraised by the Supreme People's Court as
a Typical Case of Punishing the Lawful Rights and Interests of Minors, SUP. PEOPLE'S CT. (Sep. 07, 2015),
http://sxzbxfy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=661.
), Law of the People's Republic of
&i
4 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa ( 9AIRAT
China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (promulgated by the Fifth Nat'l People's Cong., Jul. 01, 1979,

effective Jul. 01, 1979) 1979 P.R.C. LAWS (China).
5

Id.

6

Id.

See Moore Stephens v. Stone Rolls Limited (2009) UKHL 39, (2008) EWCA 644 (appeal taken from
Wales), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/1d200809/ldjudgmt/jd090730/moore-1.htm.
8 See Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures, 2001 P.R.C. LAWS,
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121 39_2447_0_7.html (China) [hereinafter FJV Law].
9 See Regulations for the Implementation of the Law on Sino-foreign Equity Joint Ventures (promulgated by
the St. Council, Sept. 20, 1983, rev'd by St. Council, Jul. 22, 2001, effective Sept. 20, 1983), art. 6,

7
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the general law in this regard and applies to all companies registered in China. The FJV falls
within the scope of the China Company Law, either when this general law is cross-referenced
by the specific laws and regulations, or when the specific laws and regulations are silent on
the question.
The Establishment of an FJV in China

The establishment of an FJV is regulated by Chapter II Establishment
Registration of the FJV Regulations, which provides, in the relevant parts:

&

A.

Article 6: The establishment of a joint venture in China shall be subject to
examination and approval by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic
Cooperation [hereinafter referred to as MOFTEC]. . . . After approval, a
certificate of approval shall be issued by MOFTEC ... ;
Article 7: When applying for establishing a joint venture, the foreign and
Chinese parties shall jointly submit the following documents to the
examination and approval authority: (1) NAN application for the
establishment of a joint venture;(2) the feasibility study report jointly
prepared by the parties to the joint venture; (3) joint venture agreement,
contract, and articles of association signed by representatives authorized by
the parties of the joint venture;(4) list of candidates for chairperson, vicechairperson and directors nominated by the parties to the venture; (5)other
documents required by the examination and approval authority;
Article 8: Upon receipt of all the documents stipulated in Article 7 of these
Regulations, the examination and approval authority shall, within three (3)
months, decide whether to approve or disapprove them;
Article 9: The applicant shall, within one (1) month after receipt of the
certificate of approval, carry out registration procedures with the
administrative authority of industry and commerce.. .The date on which the
business license of ajoint venture is issued shall be regarded as the date of
formal establishment of the joint venture.'o
An FJV can be established through an application to MOFTEC by both the Chinese
and the foreign parties to the FJV." After the FJV passes examination, MOFTEC will issue

http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/lawsdata/chineselaw/200301/20030100064563.shtml
Regualtions].

[hereinafter

FJV

See generally The Ministry of Foreign Trade of the CentralPeople's Government, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
TRADE

AND

ECONOMIC

COOPERATION

("MOFTEC")

(Dec.

7,

2010),

http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/history.shtml.
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12
Once obtained, parties to the FJV must register with the
an approval certificate.
13
Once the company is properly
Administration for Industry and Commerce within 30 days.
registered and, in turn, obtains its business license, the FJV is officially established in
accordance with Article 9 of the FJV Regulations.14
Pertinent to the general law, the China Company Law, the relevant provision also
identically provides:

Article 7: A company established according to the law shall be issued a
company business license by the company registration authority. The date
of issue of the company business license shall be that of establishment of
the company.
B.

The Distinct Formation of an FJV's Board

The formation of the board of directors of an FJV is different from that of the
companies of similar types in China. The FJV Law sets forth below:
Article 6: A joint venture shall have a board of directors, which shall have
its size and composition stipulated in the contract and the articles of
association after consultation between the parties to the venture, and the
directors shall be appointed and replaced by the parties to the venture. The
Chairman and the vice-chairman are determined by the parties to the
venture or elected by the board of directors. Either party of the Chineseforeign joint ventures may be the chairman and the other shall assume the
office of vice-chairman. In handling major problems, the board of directors
shall reach a decision through consultation by the parties to the venture, in
6
accordance with the principle of equality and mutual benefit.'
The preceding Article defines the parties as "partners;" however, that may be
misleading in the field of corporate law as a FJV is not a partnership. Pursuant to Article 4 of
17
the FJV Law, a FJV "shall take the form of a limited liability company.,,
If a FJV is a limited liability company as defined by Chapter II Establishment and
Organizational Structure of Limited Liability Companies of the China Company Law, Article
40, stipulates that a limited liability company shall have a board of directors." If a limited

12
See Detailed Rules of the Ministry of Foreign trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) on the
Approval and Control of Resident Representative Offices of Foreign Enterprises, (promulgated by Decree No 3
1, 1995),
Feb.
on
Economic Cooperation
and
Trade
of Foreign
of the Ministry
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/investment/36746.html (China).
See FJV Regulations, supra note 9, art. 9.
13
14
id.
15 Company Law of the People's Republic of China, (promulgated by the 5th Session of the Standing Comm.
of the 8th Nat' People's Cong. Dec. 29, 1993, rev'd Dec. 12, 2013) 2013 P.R.C LAWS,
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121 39_4814_0_7.html [hereinafter Company Law].

16

idp

17

id.
Company Law, supra note 15.

18
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liability company does not have a board of directors, a meeting shall be presided over by the
executive director(s). 19 The first paragraph Article 6 of the FJV Law is in conformity with
the China Company Law requirement regarding board establishment.2 0
In sharp contrast with other domestic limited liability companies, where the board
of directors is elected by shareholders, the board of directors of an FJV is established
"through consultation by the equity joint venture partners."21 Article 6 of the FJV law sets
forth the unique formation method utilized by FJVs where, "each equity joint venture partner
shall be responsible for the appointment and replacement of its own directors" 22 after the
partners consultation.2 3
III.

THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE FJV BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Distinct from other jurisdictions, such as the United States, where the board of
directors typically defend themselves, in the event of a hostile take-over FJVs opt to use
staggered boards and classify their boards in various terms. The employed means is popular
but not limited to this method utilized by the FJV.24 With respect to that of the FJV in China,
there are two relevant defenses available, discussed below.
A.

The First Defense is That the Board of Directors is the Highest Authority of the
Venture

China is primarily regarded as a civil law tradition jurisdiction. 2 5 An international
court will have to refer the provisions of the relevant laws and regulations as the primary legal
authorities. Nevertheless, the FJV law and the FJV Regulations could cause controversy.
Article 30 of the FJV Regulations furnishes the power of the board of directors:
Article 30: The highest authority of the joint venture shall be its board of
directors. It shall decide all major issues concerning the joint venture. 26
Similarly, Article 6 of the FJV Law stipulates, in the relevant part:
Article 6: A joint venture shall have a board of directors... in handling
major problems, the board of directors shall reach a decision through

19

Id.

See FJV Law, supra note 8.
Id. at art 6.
22
id.
23
id.
24
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of StaggeredBoards:
Theory, Evidence,
andPolicy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002).
23
Legal Research Guide: China, CONGRESS (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/legal-researchguide/china.php.
26
See FJV Regulations, supra note 9, art. 30.
20
21
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consultation by the parties to the venture, in accordance with the principle
of equity and mutual benefit. 27
Both Article 30 of the FJV Regulations and Article 6 of the FJV Law state the board
of directors could decide "all major issues concerning the joint venture" or in a similar phrase,
28
The provisions apparently do not
"all the important matters of an equity joint venture."
address the limitation concerning the "highest authority" of the board of directors. If reading
the face of the law, the board should be in total control of the venture. Consequently, it is
arguable that the board could refuse "the appointment and replacement of its own directors."
As such, in a variety of cases, the board of directors invokes the provisions above as
justifications.
B.

The Second Defense is that the Effective Replacement of a Board Member is
Conditional on the Success of the Registration

The administrative procedural defense could be invoked in cases by the board
members in their favor. Since an FJV falls within the scope of the China Company Law,
Article 13 of the China Company Law provides for the registration with mandatory
authorities:
Article 13: The chairman of the board, the executive director or the
manager of the company shall act as the legal representative of a company
pursuant to the articles of association of the company and the same shall be
registered according to the law. In the event of any change in the legal
representative of the company, formalities shall be carried out for
registration change.29
Article 13 states that the legal representative shall be registered according to the law.
In the event of a change in its legal representative, which is assumed by "the chairman of
the board, the executive director, or the general manager," shall also be carried out for the
3
registration change; which may be challengeable. 1
Further, Article 6, 7 and 14 of the FJV Regulations incorporating the language of the
China Company Law above, prescribe, in the relevant parts:
Article 6: The establishment of a joint venture in China shall be subject to
examination and approval by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic
Cooperation of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as
MOFTEC). After approval, a certificate of approval shall be issued by
MOFTEC....

27
28
29

See FJV Law, supra note 8, art. 6.
See FJV Regulations, supra note 9, art. 30, FJV Law, supra note 8, art. 6.
See China Company Law, supra note 15, art. 13.

30

Id.

3

See China Company Law, supra note 15, art.13.
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Article 7: When applying for establishing a joint venture, the foreign and
Chinese parties shall jointly submit the following documents to the
examination and approval authority... (4) list of candidates for
chairperson, vice-chairperson and directors nominated by the parties to the
venture;
Article 14: The agreement, contract and articles of association shall come
into force after being approved by the examination and approval authority.
The same applies in the event of amendments. 12
The board of directors is an indispensable section to be articulated in the article of
association, which is required to be submitted to authorities along with the candidates of
directors." In the event of a change to the director, vice chairman, or chairman, the approval
process shall be reinitiated as stated in Article 6, 7 and 14 of the FJV Regulations.3 4 The
amendment undertakings work both to obtain the MOFTEC approval and to conduct the
registration with the Administration for Industry and Commerce." With respect to the person
concerned, different from Article 13 of the China Company Law which requires only the legal
representative to be registered, 3 6 the FJV Regulations Article 7 sets out all the board directors
subject to registration.
On this ground, the board of directors could thus argue that the
newly appointed replacement needs to be registered before legitimately taking the seat of
directorship.
However, the replacement would be blocked internally by the current board if such a
replacement happens to the chairperson, who is designated as the legal representative of the
company in accordance with the Article 13 of the China Company Law.
Contrary to its
counterparts in the United States, as the legal representative of the company, there is more
power vested into the chairperson of the board directors. A legal representative acts on behalf
of the company in relation to both the business activities and the civil obligations. 39 It
becomes predominant when the law provides the legal representative with the exclusive
power to utilize their signature, as well as have possession of the company seal, in daily
business operations.4 0 Scholars criticize that if "the power of representation is vested in a

FJV Regulations, supra note 9, art 6, 7, 14.
See generally id
34
FJV Regulations, supra note 9, art 6, 7, 14.
35 Id
3 See The China Company Law, supra note 10.
3
FJV Regulations, supranote 9, art 6, 7, 14.
3
The China Company Law, supra note 10.
39 See generally Roles and Responsibilities of the China Legal Representative CHINA BRIEFING (Aug. 11,
2011), http://www.china-briefing.com/news/roles-and-responsibilities-of-the-china-legal-representative/.
40 Administrative Rules Governing the Registration of Companies ("Company Administrative Rules'),
'

33

MINISTRY

OF

COMMERCE

PEOPLE'S

REPUBLIC

OF

CHINA

(June

24,

1994),

http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/lawsdata/chineselaw/200306/20030600095908.shtml (stating that a legal
representative of a corporation shall be the person who represents the enterprise as its signatory in the exercise
of its functions and powers).
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42
It is worth noting that even if a
single person," 4 1 it is "inherently susceptible to abuse."
replacement targets a non-chairperson, the process is not necessarily less difficult. Since a
43
party of the venture appoints "its own directors," the dismissed director could be supported
by the controlled board or another party to the venture. In reality, it is no surprise that such a
delay could benefit other parties (e.g., in the process of liquidation).
On the grounds of legal requirement, the current board of directors would claim a
justification to demand the registration undertaking.

ANALYSIS

IV.

The following part is dedicated to assessing both the board's "highest authority"
defense and the registration procedural defense.
A.

Regarding the Board Alleged "the Highest Authority" Issue

This paper analyzes whether the FJV" board enjoys the highest authority separately through
three different perspectives as follows:
1.

The Principal-Agent Relationship Between the Directors
and the Parties to the FJV

45
According to the Agency Theory, an agency is the relationship between two
47
parties, namely, a principal and an agent. 46 The agent represents the principal in the
48
business.
In the FJV, a contract forms the relationship between the shareholders and the
49
Based on the definition of agency, shareholders are principals, and
directors of the venture.
50
directors act as their agents. Through "the appoint[ment] and replace[ment]" of its own
directors after the partners consult, the FJV parties delegate the directors to the board to
represent their interests in daily business operations."

See Charles Zhen Qu, The Representative Power of The Shareholders' General Meeting Under Chinese
Law, 17 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 295, 296 (2008).
41

42

id.

4

FJV Law, supra note 8, art.6.

4

Id.

See Stephen A. Ross, The Economic Theory ofAgency: The Principal'sProblem, 64 THE AM. ECON. REV.,
134 (1973).
Id. at 135.
4

45

47

Id.

a Id.
4 FJV Law, supra note 8, art. 3 ("The joint venture agreement, contract and articles of association signed by
the parties to the venture shall be submitted to the competent authorities of the foreign economic relations and
).
trade ....
5 See Deborah A. DeMott, Shareholders as Principals, Key Developments in Corporate Law and Equity:
Essays in Honour of Professor Harold Ford 105 (IAN RAMSAY ED., 2002).
5 FJV Law, supra note 8.
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Once a contract is formed pursuant to the FJV, such a principal-agent relationship
creates a fiduciary relationship amongst the parties. 52 The agents then owe a fiduciary duty to
the principals.5 3 Once a fiduciary duty is formed, the agent acting on behalf of the principals
must carry out the assigned tasks with the principal's best interest as priority. 5 4 The agent is
responsible for completing tasks given by the principal upon instruction with a certain level of
skill and care." Additionally, a duty of loyalty is also implied within the principal-agent
relationship, which requires the agent to refrain from putting himself or herself in a position
that creates or encourages a conflict between his or her interest and the interest of the
principal.5 6 Under the FJV, when the principal decides to terminate the principal-agent
relationship or the agent resigns, the relationship is effectively in accordance with the General
Rules of Civil Law of China. 5
The directors appointed by a party under the FJV pursuant to Article 3, creates a
principal-agent relationship.58 As a result, a fiduciary relationship is created between the
party to the FJV and the director appointed by that party. 59 Under the established
relationship, the appointed directors must carry out the assigned tasks of the owner.6o The
director is thus responsible for completing the task once the instruction is reasonably given by
the party.' Under the FJV, when a dismissing notice is given, the instruction shall be duly
honored.62 Any refusal or delay is an improper manner under the meaning of the fiduciary
duty and/or the loyalty..63 Therefore, a defense by the board director to not fulfill a duty
cannot be justified on the ground of agency theory.
2.

Shareholder Meetings Transformed as Partners Consultations

On the basis of the separation of ownership and management, which is one of the
fundamental formalities of modem companies, owners of a company could hire the skilled
management board members to conduct the complicated daily business matters on their

52

54
5
56

See DeMott, supra note 48. See also Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 (Lexis 2006).
See Restatement (Third) of Agency, § 1.01 (Lexis 2006).
Id.
Id.
Id.

7 See FJV Law, supra note 8, art. 14 (stating "[tihe contract may be terminated through consultation and
agreement by the parties to the venture, subject to approval by the approval authorities and to registration with
the state competent authorities of administration for industry and commerce.").
8

Id. art. 6.

5

Id.

6

See id., arts. 14, 16.

61

id.

62

Id.

See Melissa Horton, What are some examples of fiduciary duty?,
INVESTOPEDIA, (Dec. 15, 2017),
https://www. investopedia.com/ask/answers/04291 5/what-are-some-examples-fiduciary-duty.asp.
61
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behalf.64 Meanwhile, the separation of ownership and management would in principle
65
improve the equal treatment to all the shareholders.
In general, directors are elected by the shareholders meeting by virtue of the general
company law.66 The shareholders' voting power is enshrined in Article 37 of the China
Company Law:
Article 37: The board of shareholders shall exercise the following
functions and powers: (ii) to elect and replace directors and supervisors
that are not appointed from representatives of staff and workers, and to
decide on matters concerning the remuneration of directors and
supervisors....
In contrast with this general requirement prescribed by the China Company Law in
the preceding paragraph, the first paragraph of Article 6 of the FJV Law specifically sets
forth:
A joint venture shall have a board of directors, which shall have its size
and composition stipulated in the contract and the articles of association
after consultation between the parties to the venture, and the directors shall
be appointed and replaced by the parties to the venture. The Chairman and
the vice-chairman are determined by the parties to the venture or elected
by the board of directors. Either party of the Chinese-foreign joint ventures
may be the chairman and the other shall assume the office of vicechairman. In handling major problems, the board of directors shall reach a
decision through consultation by the parties to the venture, in accordance
with the principle of equality and mutual benefit.....
When comparing Article 37 of the China Company Law and the first paragraph of
69th
Article 6 of the FJV, the "...consultation by the equity joint venture partners"'0 replaces the
72
71
After the consultation,
shareholders" meeting as the organ of authority within the venture.
the partner to the venture is responsible for the appointment and replacement of its own
In doing so, the shareholders meeting transforms itself as the FJV partners
directors.
consult. 7 4 Thus, the ownership and management of the FJV are separated."

64

See OECD Corporate Governance Factbook, OECD (2017), https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Corporate-

Governance-Factbook.pdf.
65

Id.

6
67

See generally FJV Law, supra note 8.
Company Law, supra note 15, art. 37.
FJV Law, supra note 8.

68

7

See Company Law, supra note 15, art. 37; FJV Law, supra note 8.
See FJV Law, supra note 8
See Company Law, supra note 15, art. 37.
FJV Law, supra note 8, art. 6.
id.
Id.

7s

Id.

69
70
71
72
73
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Pursuant to the limited liability company provisions under the China Company Law,
in general, the promotors, or the founding shareholders, are made up of a limited number of
people who work closely together.7 Comparatively, pursuant to Article 4 of the FJV, the
irregular type of the limited liability company, is expected to have fewer shareholders or
77
parties in practice. Pursuant to Article 5 of the FJV, the parties to the venture are to create
an investment contract.7 8 The contract requirement helps to ascertain the intent of the parties
to the venture. 7 9 This is feasible because the participant parties are a few in number. When
the Chinese law was drafted over forty years ago, the nation was concerned about issues of
international travel and communications The law further remains flexible in order to fulfill
the country's "open up policy" objectives to attract foreign investments. 8 0 Thus, the
fundamental formality of modem companies, the separation of ownership and management, is
respected by the FJV Law.81 The parties to the venture are not deprived of their shareholder
power regarding the appointment and replacement of its own directors.8 Instead, the partners
consult and appoint substitutes at their shareholders meeting.
Therefore, the board's
authority is limited.84 The asserted highest authority of the board of directors contradicts with
the fundamental separation, and wrongly mingles the ownership with the management.8 5
3.

Interpretation of "All Major Issues" and "All the Important Issues"

The verbiage "[aill major issues" pursuant to Article 18 of the China Company Law,
and "[a]ll the important problems" pursuant to Article 6 of the FJV, are translated slightly
See Company Law, supra note 15, art. 71 ("The shareholders of a limited liability company may
transfer all
or part of their equity interests among them. Where a shareholder transfers its equity interests to a person other
than a shareholder, it shall obtain the consent of more than half of the other shareholders... Provided all
conditions are equal, the other shareholders shall have the priority purchase right for the equity interests the
transfer of which has been consented by the shareholders...."). See also, China Company Law, supra note 15,
art. 34 (stating "[w]hen the company increases its capital, the shareholder shall have the priority right to
subscribe for capital contribution in proportion to its paid-up capital contribution .....").
" See FJV Law, supra note 8, art. 4, C'An equity joint venture shall take the form of a limited liability
company .....").
7
See FJV Law, supra note 8 art. 5 ("[Tlhe various contributions referred to in the present Article shall be
specified in the contracts concerning the equity joint venture or in its articles of association, and the value of
each contribution (excluding that of the site) shall be ascertained by the parties to the venture through joint
assessment.").
" See Company Law, supra note 15 ("When applying, the foreign and Chinese parties shall jointly submit the
following documents to the examination and approval authority: (1) an application for the establishment of a
joint venture; (2) the feasibility study report jointly prepared by the parties to the joint venture; (3) joint venture
agreement, contract and articles of association signed by representatives authorized by the parties to the
venture.").
8
See Guoqiang Long, China's Policies on FDI; Review and Evaluation, CDGEV 315, 318 (2005),
https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/9780881323818-Chl2.pdf.
8' See generally FJV Regulations, supra note 9.
.82 Id
76

83
84
85

Id
Id
Id
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differently, yet both originate from a Chinese text, "zhong da wen ti." Article 30 of the FJV
Regulations text reads: "The highest authority of the joint venture shall be its board of
87
The second
directors. It shall decide all major issues concerning the joint venture."
sentence, however, states that the board decides "all major issues," namely, "zhong da wen
ti."" However, because the FJV is a limited liability company, Article 36 of the China
Company Law states that the board of shareholders is the organ of authority in a limited
liability company." In the FJV, the power of the board of shareholders is transformed
pursuant to the parties to the venture.90 Therefore, Article 6 of the FJV will likely cause a
direct confrontation of power between the board of directors and the parties to the venture.
On the other hand, when cross-referencing Article 6, second paragraph, of the FJV
Law, the "zhong da wen ti" defines "all major issues" by setting out the list of the functions
and powers of the board of the directors regarding hiring issues in a diminishing manner as

follows:
The functions and powers of the board of directors are, as stipulated in the
articles of association of the equity joint venture, to discuss and decide all
major issues concerning the venture, namely, the venture's development
plans, proposals for production and business operations, the budget for
revenues and expenditures, the distribution of profits, the plans concerning
manpower and wages, the termination of business, and the appointment or
employment of the general manager, the vice-general manager(s) the chief
engineer, the treasurer and the auditors, as well as the determination of
92
their functions, powers and terms of employment ....
As demonstrated above, Article 6, second paragraph, of the FJV Law provides for a
long list of the functions and powers of the board of directors, wherein, there is no
93
prescription in relation to "the appoint[ment] and replace[ment]" of its own directors.
Instead, paragraph 1 of Article 6 elaborates the power of the parties to the venture to address
Within this context, the first
"the appointment and replacement of its own directors."9
paragraph of Article 6 of the FJV Law includes the power of the board of directors to discuss
95
"all major issues concerning the venture." Thus, the highest authority to decide "all major

See Company Law, supra note 15; FJV Regulations, supra note 9; Lu Shao Chang & MA 1976, Yingyi
8
zhong de wen ti, Nan yang da xue, yan jiu yuan, hua yu yan jiu zhong xin, Xin jia po,
https://nla.gov.au/anbd.bib-anl5477917 (China).
8
See FJV Regulations, supra note 9, art. 30 (emphasis added).
8

Id.
See Company Law, supra note 15, art. 36, ("The board of shareholders of a limited liability company shall
be composed of all the shareholders. The board of shareholders shall be the organ of authority of the company
and shall exercise its functions and powers pursuant to the Law.").
9 See FJV Regulations, supra note 9, art. 6.
89

91

Id.

92
9

See FJV Law, supra note 8, art.6.

9
9

Id.
Id.

Id.
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issues concerning the venture" should not be read so expansively to subvert the purpose and
object of the other provisions of this Article. 96
The FJV Regulations issued by the State Council are superseded by the FJV Law
promulgated by the Congress in the event of conflict, and to the extent of conflict.97 Put
another way, on the condition that both the laws and the regulations concern such a specific
topic, if the FJV Regulations conflict with the specific governing FJV Law, the provision of
the FJV Law prevails.9 The text of "zhong da wen ti" in Article 30 of the FJV Regulations
must be read together with the context of Article 6 of the FJV Law where "zhong da wen ti"
is explicitly given the meaning that the power of the appointment and replacement of its
directors is out of its reach. 99 Therefore, the proposition by the board of directors in this
regard gives no justification in the context of the laws and regulations.
B.

The Second Issue Regarding the Registration Procedural Contention by the
Board

The Supreme People's Court of China in Sino-environment Technology, oo
illustrates the issue of whether the replacement of the board of directors is conditioned upon
succeeding the registration in connection with a newly appointed director.' 01
1.

Factual Background of the Case

Sino-environment Technology Group (Fujian) Limited is a foreign enterprise
subsidiary registered in China Fujian Province. 1 02 Sino-environment Technology Group
Limited is the parent holding company incorporated in Singapore.10 3 Later, the parent
company went into liquidation.'" The Singaporean liquidator was officially assigned to
represent the parent holding company.'os The liquidator dismissed the board of directors of
the subsidiary and appointed its own managing partner as the new chairperson of the board.106
The new chairperson serves as the legal representative on the subsidiary's behalf. 107 The

Id.
See Legislation Law of the People's Republic of China, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECuTIVE CoMMISION ON
CHINA, https://www.cecc.gov/resourceslegal-provisionslegislation-law-chinese-and-english-text (last visited
Oct. 6, 2018) (explaining that the law's effectiveness is higher than that of administrative regulations, local
laws and regulations and rules).
" See generally id.
9
See The FJV Regulations, supra note 9, art. 30. See also The FJV Law, supra note 8, art. 6.
'" See Sino-environment Technology, supra note 2.
1'0
See Webb, supranote 2.
102
Id. at p. 3.
03
Id.
9

97

104

Id

105

id.

107

Id
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liquidator further instructed the new chairperson to reduce the registered capital of the
subsidiary to relieve its financial burden."'
. However, the subsidiary's incumbents internally blocked the new chairperson's
109
In doing so, they argued the new chairperson had no
registration with authorities in China.
10
authority to act on behalf of the company since he was not registered.o In contrast with
capital reduction instructed by the owner, the subsidiary's original chairperson/legal
representative and the original board initiated the litigation against the foreign parent
company in Fujian Province Higher People's Court. The issue was over the fulfillment of the
obligation to increase RMB 45 million registered capital as the decision was properly passed
by the original board."' The newly appointed chairperson/legal representative of Sinoenvironment Technology Group (Fujian) Limited, on the other hand, filed a motion to
112
The successor contended
withdraw this litigation which was initiated by the incumbents.
that since the former management was removed, the former managers lacked authority of
representation. 1 3 Therefore, filing such a lawsuit against its shareholders was not the "real
intention" of its subsidiary.114
2.

Legislative Intent of the Registration Requirement Explained by China
Supreme People's Court

The issue in Sino-environment Technology is central to whether the successful
registration of the newly appointed chairperson/legal representative with the authorities serves
11 5
as the condition to effectuate the removal of the original board and the incumbent directors.
The Court interpreted that the legislative intent of the registration embodied in
Article 13 of the China Company Law is to disclose to the public the basic state of
management.1 1 6 A third party outside the company shall be able to make the judgment with
knowledge of the registration regarding whether someone has power to act on behalf of the
Nevertheless, regarding the internal dispute between a company management and
entity.
its shareholders over the appointment and replacement of its chairperson and/or the board, the
judgment shall be made upon whether the valid resolution is reached by the shareholders."'
Insofar as the resolution is valid, the legal effect of the new appointment and replacement of
the original board shall take place within the company.

108

Id.

109

See Sino-environment Technology, supra note 2.

110

Id.

111

-d.

112

id

113

Id.

114

Id.

See Webb, supra note 2.
See China Company Law, supra note 10, art. 13 ("stating The chairman of the board, the executive
director or the manager of the company shall act as the legal representative of a company pursuant to the
articles of association of the company and the same shall be registered according to the law. In the event of any
change in the legal representative of the company, formalities shall be carried out for registration change").
117 See Webb, supra note 101.
" See Sino-environment Technology, supra note 2.
Id.
11
11s
116
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The Supreme People's Court clarified that the mandatory registration with the
authorities is not the condition to validate such a replacement or removal.1 20 The appointment
and replacement shall take place "within the company." 1 2 1 in the first place. 1 22
3.

The Authority and Significance of This Supreme Court Case

Sino-environment Technology is a "typical case" issued by the Supreme Court at its
official venue. The other venue falls under the regime of China's guiding cases system.12 3
Under the regime of the current national judicial reform in China, the highest court is required
to periodically publish both the guiding cases and the typical cases to guide the practice
through nationwide China's judicial system.124 The cases serve to have a "guiding effect on
adjudication and enforcement work in courts throughout the country," 2 5 while the typical
cases are regarded as the standard of reference for judges. 12 Due to the highest status of the
hearing court in the hierarchy, the typical cases decided by the Supreme Court are much more
persuasive, second only to guiding cases in terms of the authority.127
On the basis of its legal significance and its impact on international business,
international legal institutions initiated training programs for international legal practitioners
on China's guiding case system.
On the basis of the importance of the issue involved and
the impact on the international business, 129 Sino-environment Technology is so referred here.
V.

CONCLUSION

The analyses conclude that the two defenses are invalid. With regard to the first
issue, in light of the various analyses above, the board of directors, "the highest authority,"
should be confined based on the principal-agent theory. The agent owes a fiduciary duty to
the business owner to act on the owner's behalf with loyalty. When reading the laws side by
side, the power of appointment and replacement of directors, which is specified with the

120

id

121
122

Id.

See Webb, supranote 101.
See Judicial Reform in China, Information Office
of the St.
http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_28147498303170.htm.
124
id.
123

Council

(Oct.

2012),

125
See Provisions of the Supreme People's Courtt. Concerning Work on Case Guidance, (promulgated by the
Adjudication Comm. of the Sup. People's Ct. on Nov. 15, 2010, effective Nov. 26, 2010), CHINA GUIDING
CASE PROJECT (Jun., 2015), http://cgc.1aw.stanford.edulguiding- cases-rules/20101126-english/.
126
See Sino-environment Technology, supra note 2.
127

Wang

Xiaojing,

An

Li

na

dian

shi

(0####JL)

(2015),

http://lawyer.ruc.edu.cn/html/lvshijie/20150624/3875.html (China).
128
Supreme People's Court Monitor, Case Law Chinese Style-where
Is It Going? (2015),
https://supremepeoplescourtmonitor.com/tag/typical-cases/ (last visited Jan.4, 2017) (China).
129
See Webb, supra note 2, (stating that in spite of typical cases which is not within the scope of the
defined
"guiding cases," the Stanford Law School project implicitly confirms typical cases an imperative part of the
Chinese new legal regime).
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"partner's consultation," is not vested within the board of directors. The design of the law
is consistent with the separation of ownership and management.
In relation to the second issue, the typical case adjudicated by the Supreme People's
Court clarifies that the legislative intent of the management registration with the authorities is
to disclose to the public; whereas the "internal" appointment and replacement of its directors
takes place "within the company," to the extent of the decision being properly resolved by the
owners of the venture. Furthermore, the two issues above are interconnected as illustrated in
Sino-environment Technology. The ruling also infers that the shareholders ultimate power
over the board of directors on the ground that the "internal" appointment and replacement of
its directors takes place "within the company." Therefore, it is not accurate to read the face of
the law that the board of directors is the highest authority of the FJV.

Recommendations
The goal of the following discussion is to offer advice, to an FJV that is either in the
liquidation process or an FJV which is still in good standing.
1.

The New Practice Deviates from the to Form the Board of Shareholders Instead

Chinese authorities acquiesce that a FJV will derogate from the FJV Law "partners
consultation" discipline in order to establish the board of shareholders in practice. As
mentioned earlier, the FJV is regarded as a limited liability company."' However, the
empirical research shows that a large number of FJVs are the listed companies,132 which are
33
Strictly speaking, the practice
not within the parameters of a limited liability company.1
deviates from a provision of the FJV Law, Article 120 of the China Company law reads:
For the purposes of the Law, the term "listed company" refers to a
company limited by shares whose shares are listed and traded on a stock
exchange. 134
As this Article has previously stated, a public "listed company" is named "a
13
company limited by shares.", 5 For example, Inner Mongolia North Hauler Joint Stock Co.,
Ltd. an FJV, is listed and traded on the stock exchange in China. 136 The foreign investor is
37
Further studies show that, as early as 2001, MOFTEC and
Terex Equipment Limited.1

See FJV Regulations, supra note 9.
See FJV Regulations, supra note 9, art.16, ("[A] joint venture is a limited liability company").
Id. art. 34.

130

13'
132

13
134
133
136

id.
Company Law, supra note 15.
id.
Id. art. 120 ("For the purposes of the Law, the term 'listed company' refers to a company limited by shares

whose shares are listed and traded on a stock exchange").
See Market Stocks, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/markets/stocks (last visited Sept. 5, 2018).
137
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China Securities Committee issued a new rule, titled "Some Opinions Relevant to Foreign
Investment in Listed Companies," 138 which provides in relevant part:
Article 1: The establishment of foreign-invested stock companies: The
establishment of foreign-invested stock companies or the application of
existing foreign-invested limited liability companies for changing into
foreign-invested stock companies shall satisfy the requests as mentioned in
the Interim Provisions on Some Issues Regarding the Establishment of
Foreign-invested Stock Companies (Order No. 1 [1995] of the MOFTEC)
and shall be subject to the approval of the MOFTEC according to
stipulated procedures.13 9
This rule governs the access that FJVs have to the Chinese stock market.1 4 0 There
have been hundreds of FJVs listed and traded on the Chinese stock market thereafter.141
Nevertheless, this is not a unique foreign investment policy from the international business
perspective.142 With respect to the foreign investment policy, both Australia and Canada also
require some foreign investors to be listed with the stock exchange of Australia and
Canada. 14 Chinese authorities even encouraged those non-listed FJVs to issue B-Share
stocks, which was a vehicle utilized to offer stock issuance solely to foreign investors.'44 This
policy was purported to attract more foreign investment.145
The listed FJVs taking the form of a company limited by shares shall convene the
shareholders meeting.146 Thus, the establishment of the shareholders meeting turns to be
compulsory for the transformed FJV. 147 The China Company Law sets forth the shareholders
meeting in the following articles:

138
See Notice of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and China Securities Regulatory
Commission on Issuing the Some Opinions Relevant to Foreign Investment in Listed Companies, (promulgated
by Ministry of Foreign Economy & Trade and China Securities Regulatory Commission, Oct. 08, 2001,
effective Oct. 08, 2001) CLI 4.37539 (EN) (China).

14
1'
142

id.
See Company List, SSE, http://english.sse.com.cnlisted/company/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2018).
See David Fickling, China's Foreign Investment Door Opens, But Only Barely,
BLOOMBERG

(Jul. 25,
2018, 10:56 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-07-02/china-s-foreign-investment-dooropens-but-only-barely.
14
See
Australia's
Foreign
Investment
Policy,
DEPT.
OF
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
https://firb.gov.au/files/2015/09/Australias-Foreign-Investment-Policy-2016-2017.pdf
(last visited Feb. 2,
2018).
1" See generally Business Alert- China, HKTDC (Aug. 15, 2001), http://info.hktdc.com/alert/cba-e0108c.htm.
145 id.
14
See China Company Law, supra note 15, art.100.
1'
See FJV Regulations, supra note 9.
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Article 98: The general meeting of a company limited by shares shall be composed
of all shareholders. The general meeting shall be the organ of authority of the
company and shall exercise its functions and powers in accordance with the Law.148
Article 100: The annual general meeting of the general meeting shall be
held once every year. An extraordinary general meeting shall be convened
within two months of the occurrence of any of the following
circumstances....
In sum, FJVs are not prohibited from forming their board of shareholders to improve
control. 150 Some FJVs can even employ a more complex ownership structure. In reality, the
shareholders' meeting improves the management of the FJVs.'" It is becoming a trend to
52
install shareholder meetings, as evidenced by the increasing amount of FJVs listed.1
2.

Modifying the AoA of the FJV to Specify Board Director Replacement Issue

As addressed above, the issue is caused not only because the law is ambiguous, but
also because the FJV's bylaws are silent as to the appointment and replacement of its
13
In general, a FJV needs to adopt both
directors, specifically in the article of association.
the language of the FJV Regulations and the format provided by the office of the
54
Chinese local attorneys also prefer to use the
Administration for Industry and Commerce.1
conforming language and the legal documents recommended by the authorities so that they
55
For instance, in the last case
could pass the approval and registration and move forward.
wherein the article of association of the troubled venture duplicated stated that "the board of
This time
directors was the highest authority of the venture" from the law discussed above.
bomb remains latent until the chasm of the shareholders appears.' To avoid such potential
issues, the FJV counsels should review the articles of association and address the issue in a
practical manner.1
The backfire of the appointment and replacement of its own directors could either
go alone or in connection with the entire board and/or other parties of the enmity. Sinoenvironment Technology exemplifies the problem with the board people with the cognizance

141

See The China Company Law, supra note 15, art 100.

149

id.

'

See OECD Corporate Governance Factbook, supra note 64.

151

Id

152

Id.

153

See Guidelines for Articles of Association of Listed Companies, IBDC, (2014), http://www.icbc-

ltd.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/ICBC/Resources/ICBCLTD/download/2014/GuidelinesforArticles20l41114
.pdf.
Citizens
See Nanning Intermediate People's Court of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region (2014) South
4647

Second Word No. 339, http://wenshu.court.gov.cn/content/content?DoclD=43bf8c43-caeaaa7e679afc64&KeyWord=-gaTJ|OgfAME (last visited Dec. 8,2018) (China).
5
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of business will concur that other parties to the venture cannot be irrelevant to the internal
power struggle." 9 The conflict of the parties to a venture is further defined as the five stages
of development from latent conflict to manifest conflict due to the joint venture parties'
differing interests and goals. '6 When the FJV comes in the case of a party withdrawal, it is
not necessary that the director, even if he was previously appointed by the party, be on the
party's side once the person in the scenario is promised to stay after the departure of the
investor. Therefore, without a section in the bylaws to clarify the appointment and
replacement of its directors to immediately take down the director and substitute with another,
the interest of the departing party could hardly be sufficiently guarded during the tumultuous
final stage of the venture.
3.

Attempt to Secure the Chairperson Position of the Board of Directors

Finally, a party to the FJV should try to take the chairperson seat of the board of
directors. The chairperson of the board serves as a legal representative, which acts on behalf
of the board in relation to business activities, as well as civil obligations. 1 6 ' In the course of
daily business operations, the chairperson should be able to safeguard every transaction
because the official seal of the venture and the signature are in his or her possession.162
The following FJV proceeding proves it costly because the foreign party did not.163
A United States automotive parts supplier entered into a FJV in China.'64 The American
party contributed cash, whereas the other parties to the venture contributed equipment and
land.1 6 5
Regarding the board of directors, the American party did not secure the
chairperson/legal representative position; instead they appointed a general manager to
supervise the operation.166 After the undertaking of the registration with authorities, the
general manager noticed the contributed equipment asset was not what was prescribed in the
contract, consequently, he refused it.
After rounds of negotiations, the controversy
remained.16 8 The general manager went back for holidays and expected to solve the issue in
the next year. 16 9 After the general manager returned to China, he was informed that the
chairperson/legal representative of the FJV, who was appointed by another party, sued his
own company for the rental fee and then emptied the FJV's bank account, consisting mostly
of the American party's cash. The American party rushed to hire an attorney, but the law
requires that the legal action needs to be initiated by the legal representative of the company

... See Sino-environment Technology, supranote 2.
'6
Louis R. Pondy, OrganizationalConflict: Concepts and Models, 12 ADMIN. Sci. Q., 296-320 (1967).
161
See CHINA BRIEFING, supra note 39.
162 See generally FJV Regulations,
supranote 9.
161 See generally Shareholder Agreements and Joint
Ventures in China § 4:8 (Westlaw).
164

Id.

165
166

Id.
id.

167

Id.

'

IdS g
See generally Shareholder Agreements and Joint Ventures in China § 4:8 (Westlaw).
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In this particular case, that means
and served on the legal representative of the defendant.
that the American party needs to enforce the legal representative of the venture to initiate a
lawsuit on behalf of the venture, against himself who acts on behalf the same venture, to
recover any portion of the original funds."
Therefore, proper holding of the chairperson position of the board of directors
means, in many circumstances, the interest of the party could be better protected. Even in the
case where the chairperson, as agent, was lacking loyalty, the party could make a prompt
replacement. In the international business arena, it could still be less dangerous because if the
person's hiring contract is well drafted, both the governing law and the jurisdiction of the
hiring contract should be binding. Thus, the hiring contract should be able to hold the agent
accountable.

17

See generally Shareholder Agreements and Joint Ventures in China § 4:8 (Westlaw).
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